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7 The Role of Macroeconomic 
Policy in Export-Led Growth: 
The Experience of Taiwan and 
South Korea 
Kenneth S. Lin, Hsiu-Yun Lee, and Bor-Yi Huang 
7.1 Introduction 
Inflation, unemployment, and budget deficits have long been the focus of 
macroeconomic policy. Recently, macroeconomists turned their attention to 
growth and development. One remarkable result in the new endogenous 
growth theory is that government policy can affect the steady state growth rate. 
Empirical analysis of the effect of macroeconomic policy on long-run growth 
has so far produced mixed results. 
The purpose of this paper is to characterize the role of macroeconomic pol- 
icy in the export-led growth experience of Taiwan and South Korea. Argentina, 
Chile, Taiwan, and South Korea all started their postwar economic develop- 
ment with an import-substitution approach in the 1950s. However, after three 
decades, Argentina and Chile, unlike Taiwan and South Korea, showed medio- 
cre macroeconomic performance with erratic GDP growth and high inflation 
(Lin 1988). One fundamental difference is that Taiwan and South Korea 
switched to an export-led approach in the 1960s. What is the role of macroeco- 
nomic policy in successful export-led growth, a causal factor or an inevitable 
choice? 
For a country adopting an export-led approach, we argue that international 
competition forces households, firms, and government in this country to react 
to external shocks optimally, and their decisions and policies are endogenous. 
Kenneth S. Lin is professor of economics at National Taiwan University. Hsiu-Yun Lee is associ- 
ate professor of economics at the Graduate Institute of International Economics, National Chung 
Cheng University. Bor-Yi Huang is associate professor of finance at Shih Chien College, Taipei. 
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It is natural that any pattern of correlation between macroeconomic policy and 
economic growth is possible, depending on the underlying external shocks. 
The correlation patterns under export-led regimes are also unlikely to dominate 
the outcomes of cross-country growth regressions, so the empirical results ob- 
tained in cross-country growth regressions may not be useful in revealing the 
role of macroeconomic policy in export-led growth. 
Since the ultimate goal of any economic policy of export-led growth is 
maintaining and enhancing the international competitiveness of the country’s 
export goods, this goal in turn disciplines macroeconomic policy that prevents 
the adoption of any measure hurting export growth. Even though there are 
many instruments available for implementing macroeconomic policy, not all 
of them are free instruments in achieving such a particular objective. For Tai- 
wan and South Korea, we found that sound fiscal policy gives the set of avail- 
able instruments the maximum degree of freedom. For example, suppose that 
government is under pressure to offer greater fiscal incentives to compensate 
exporting firms for profit losses caused by temporary external shocks. The gov- 
ernments that can offer such incentives by running a temporarily high level of 
budget deficits are those that have sound fiscal discipline. 
It is through the conduct of monetary and exchange rate policies that the 
central bank has its most profound influence on inflation, interest rates, ex- 
change rates, and the balance of payments. The central bank in developed 
countries has been designed as the monetary authority whose primary respon- 
sibility is to maintain price stability. However, the central bank in most devel- 
oping countries has difficulty in achieving the goal of price stability because 
of the two roles it plays: First, its development bank role requires the central 
bank to use exchange rate management and to provide interest rate subsidies 
or preferential loans to promote growth. Second, its fiscal support role requires 
the central bank to generate inflation tax revenues for the government. Even 
though the central banks in Taiwan and South Korea are not independent com- 
pared to their counterparts in developed countries our case study indicates that 
sound fiscal policy allows these central banks to play a more active role in 
promoting exports without immediately jeopardizing price stability. However, 
as the importance of the export-led approach as a source of growth declines, it 
is more likely that government spending becomes an important fiscal instru- 
ment in stimulating economic growth. A less independent central bank will be 
a cause of concern since it makes inflationary finance easier. Therefore, design- 
ing an independent central bank could be crucial for both countries’ future 
macroeconomic performance. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 7.2, we pres- 
ent some stylized facts on macroeconomic policy and economic growth. When 
macroeconomic policy and aggregate variables such as inflation rate, invest- 
ment, and exports all respond to external shocks, virtually any pattern of corre- 
lation between macroeconomic policy and economic variables can be ob- 
tained. This makes regression results difficult to interpret regarding the links 
between macroeconomic policy and aggregate variables. In section 7.3, we use 
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a case study to evaluate the role of macroeconomic policy in export-led 
growth. First, we construct two indexes of central bank independence for Tai- 
wan; we do not find a negative association between inflation and central bank 
independence in Taiwan or South Korea. In searching for the explanation, we 
focus on the relation between fiscal discipline and moderate inflation. In sec- 
tion 7.4, we use the special loan policy to address the point that the macroeco- 
nomic policy adopted by a government is highly influenced by the structure of 
the domestic economy. In section 7.5, we look at current account and exchange 
rate management and argue that the export success of Taiwan and South Korea 
is not a product of aggressive devaluations. Section 7.6 offers some conclud- 
ing remarks. 
7.2 Macroeconomic Policy and Growth: Some Stylized Facts 
In this section, we present some stylized facts on macroeconomic policy and 
growth. The most crucial link between macroeconomic policy and long-run 
growth is that a higher investment-GDP ratio leads to better GDP growth. Table 
7.1 shows that the associations between them for both Taiwan and South Korea 
are not positive across all subperiods.’ Taiwan had a sharp decrease in 
investment-GDP ratio without any negative impact on growth rate between the 
periods 1981-85 and 1986-90, while South Korea experienced a sharp in- 
crease in investment-GDP ratio without an increase in growth rate between the 
periods 1971-75 and 1976-80. This suggests that a higher (lower) investment- 
GDP ratio does not necessarily lead to rapid (slow) economic growth. Re- 
cently, Fischer (1991) found that a sharp increase in investment between the 
periods 1960-73 and 1973-80 did not lead to an increase in the growth rate in 
regions like Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Dervis and Petri (1987) also re- 
ported that investment is not well correlated with growth in their study of the 
seven most rapidly growing countries (Taiwan, South Korea, Brazil, Thailand, 
Portugal, Greece, and Yugoslavia) for the 1965-85 period. The evidence here 
confirms this cross-regional empirical regularity. 
What are the factors that account for the less clear positive relationship? 
Taiwan decided to pursue an industrial targeting policy after the first oil shock. 
Since most private enterprises were uninterested in joining the heavy and 
chemical industry development plan, the government and state-owned enter- 
prises had to carry out most of the plan. As a result, the ratio of investment by 
state-owned enterprises to GDP rose to 9.1 percent in the 1976-80 period (see 
table 7. 1).2 Those state-owned enterprises, however, are known for inefficiency 
and mass corruption in undertaking investment projects. As a result, higher 
investment spending did not lead to higher real capital stock and higher pro- 
1. Here investment is measured by fixed capital formation. 
2. An enterprise is state-owned if the government has more than half of the ownership. Ac- 
cording to Young’s (1993) calculation, Taiwan’s state-owned enterprises accounted for, on average, 
46 percent of machinery and equipment investment during the 1951-91 period. 
Table 7.1 Basic Statistics of Taiwanese and South Korean Development 
Period Taiwan South Korea 
1961-65 
1966-70 
197 1-75 
1976-80 
1981-85 
1986-90 
196 1-65 
1966-70 
197 1-75 
1976-80 
1981-85 
1986-90 
1961-65 
1966-70 
197 1-75 
1976-80 
1981-85 
1986-90 
1961-65 
1966-70 
I97 1-75 
1976-80 
198 1-85 
1986-90 
1961-65 
1966-70 
1971-75 
1976-80 
1981-85 
1986-90 
1961-65 
1966-70 
1971-75 
1976-80 
1986-90 
196 1-65 
197 1-75 
1976-80 
1986-90 
198 1-85 
1966-70 
198 1-85 
Per Capita Real GDP Growth Rate 
6.7 
6.3 
6.6 
8.2 
4.9 
7.2 
Injution Rate (Implicit GDP dejator/CPI) 
2.711.6 
4.613.9 
10.6l11.1 
838.6 
3.613.8 
2.312.2 
Ex Post Real Interest Rate 
3.3 
1.5 
-3.4 
-0.7 
3.8 
3.4 
Investment-GDP Ratio 
15.6 (4.2) 
21.1 (6.0) 
26.3 (8.7) 
27.6 (9.1) 
23.5 (6.9) 
20.5 (4.4) 
Export-GDP Ratio 
17.0 
25.1 
41.7 
50.9 
53.1 
53.7 
Government Expenditure-GDP Ratio 
12.3 
13.0 
12.0 
12.9 
14.9 
14.2 
Deficit-GDP Ratio 
0.93 
0.69 
- 1.20 
-1.19 
0.75 
-0.02 
3.5 
7.3 
6.7 
5.7 
6.7 
8.7 
17.511 5.9 
14.711 1.8 
17.9114.2 
19.1l15.9 
7.016.9 
5.415.3 
-1.5 
12.2 
-1.8 
-1.2 
4.4 
4.6 
13.1 
23.4 
22.9 
30.1 
28.5 
30.8 
6.0 
12.5 
23.9 
31.0 
35.4 
37.0 
13.9 
17.1 
15.4 
16.3 
17.0 
16.1 
0.63 
0.72 
1.76 
I .66 
1.34 
-0.30 
Sources: International Financial Statistics 1994 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 
various issues); Taiwan, Central Government Budget Yearbook (Taipei: Directorate-General of 
Budget, Accounting, and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, various issues). 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are ratios of investment by state-owned enterprises to GDP. 
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ductivity, and many projects turned out to be failures because of poor deci- 
sions. In the first half of the 1980s, as the number of investment projects under- 
taken by the government and state-owned enterprises declined, the investment- 
GDP ratio decreased but had no negative impact on economic growth. 
About the same time, the South Korean government adopted an industrial 
targeting policy with similar objectives. But it emphasized fostering large- 
scale firms in the private sector through extensive state support and close coop- 
eration between large firms (chaebols) and the government. In the heavy and 
chemical industry (HCI) program, the government provided very generous 
industry-specific incentives, including tax breaks, preferential loans, interest 
rate subsidies for participating firms, and import restrictions on targeted indus- 
tries. Targeted industries were overinvested and had a substantial level of idle 
capacity. The chaebols instructed to undertake the investment projects were 
never blamed for any poor performance. Further, whenever an investment proj- 
ect failed, state-owned banks assumed full responsibility and defrayed the loss 
with inflationary tax revenues. 
Because an increasing number of investment projects in Taiwan and South 
Korea were decided on the basis of strategic considerations, those projects 
could no longer be evaluated according to the efficiency of investment fund 
allocation. Allocative inefficiency could explain the absence of a clear positive 
association for Taiwan and South Korea3 Further, as displayed in figure 7.1, 
the peaks of investment-GDP ratio in Taiwan occurred in 1975 and 1980, 
which lagged behind the peak in South Korea about one year. To stay close to 
its chief rival, state-owned enterprises and government in Taiwan often rushed 
to undertake investment projects when Taiwan found itself lagging behind in 
the race. Finally, according to Dollar and Sokoloff (1989) and Lin and Chan 
(1992), although enormous effort and resources have been devoted to the in- 
dustrial targeting policies, those policies failed to affect the aggregate perfor- 
mance of the two economies measured in terms of productivity growth, struc- 
tural change, and aggregate performance of exports. 
Concerning the relationship between macroeconomic policy and GDP 
growth, four findings are worth mentioning. First, unlike the cross-regional 
evidence for Latin America and Asia in table 7.2, a negative relationship does 
not exist between GDP growth and inflation for Taiwan and South Korea. In 
theory, higher inflation reduces the efficiency of exchange mechanism. Once 
more resources are devoted to transactions and cash management instead of to 
production in an inflationary environment, higher inflation increases the actual 
cost of capital goods and hence reduces in~estment.~ 
3. The Singaporean government has also pursued an active industrial targeting policy. This pol- 
icy allowed the Singaporean economy to catch up and surpass Hong Kong’s initial lead in manu- 
facturing. However, Young (1992) argued that the massive investment rates under this industrial 
targeting policy have led to the low total factor productivity growth in Singapore. 
4. This mechanism has been developed by Fischer (1983) in a neoclassical growth model and 
by De Gregorio (1992) in an endogenous growth model. 
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Fig. 7.1 Investment-GDP ratio 
Sources: Taiwan, Financial Staristics Monthly, Taiwan District, R.O.C. (Taipei: Central Bank of 
China, various issues); South Korea, International Finuncial Staristics (Washington, D.C.: Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund, various issues). 
Table 7.2 Inflation and Growth 
Per Capita Real 
Period GDP Growth Rate Inflation Rate 
1965-73 
1974-80 
1981-90 
1965-73 
1974-80 
198 1-90 
1965-73 
1974-80 
1981-90 
1965-73 
1974-80 
198 1-90 
1965-73 
1974-80 
198 1-90 
Africa 
1.1 
0.4 
-1.0 
Asia 
3.2 
3.7 
4.9 
Latin America 
3.3 
2.5 
-0.9 
Taiwan 
8.0 
6.3 
6.1 
South Korea 
6.9 
5.6 
7.7 
5.2 
15.8 
18.9 
14.8 
8.9 
6.9 
22.0 
53.0 
249.0 
4.3 
11.5 
3.0 
10.9 
17.7 
6.1 
Source: Africa, Asia, and Latin America numbers are taken from Fischer (1993). Taiwan and South 
Korea numbers are authors’ calculation. 
Second, table 7.1 shows that a less clear positive association exists between 
ex post real interest rates and per capita GDP growth rates in Taiwan than in 
South Korea. Markets for primary securities are generally underdeveloped in 
developing countries. Therefore, private financial savings are mainly currency 
and deposits. If the real rates of return on these assets become significantly 
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negative as a consequence of inflationary finance or credit overexpansion, then 
private financial savings held in these claims will decrease and less saving can 
be channeled into productive investment through the formal banking system.s 
This could hurt economic growth. Taiwan has a significant informal (or unreg- 
ulated) financial sector, which has been a major supplier of funds for small 
and medium-sized firms in Taiwan.6 Although Taiwanese monetary authorities 
adopted a restrictive monetary policy, it is the informal financial sector that 
results in a less clear association. On the other hand, negative real interest rates 
in the periods 1961-65 and 1971-80 did not significantly hurt South Korean 
growth performance. When an economy has no access to international bor- 
rowing and lending, domestic saving becomes the only source of funds for 
investment. Negative real interest rates could hurt growth through a decrease 
in private financial saving. Since South Korea was able to borrow against its 
future trade surpluses in the international credit market, negative real interest 
rates had less impact on growth. 
Third, a government that runs large budget deficits has bad macroeconomic 
policy if the budget deficits result from (1) an inefficient tax system and (2) 
out-of-control increases in government spending. According to table 7.1, GDP 
growth was negatively correlated with the budget deficit-GDP ratio for South 
Korea during the period 1961-80, while no such clear association exists for 
Taiwan during the period 1961-93. Taiwan’s central government budget sur- 
pluses even stayed at the level of 1.2 percent of GDP in the 1970s, which 
provided cash reserves when the government ran huge deficits in the late 1980s 
(see fig. 7.2). The plots of the centered five-year moving averages of the GDP 
growth and budget deficit-GDP ratio in figure 7.30 suggest a positive associa- 
tion for Taiwan in the 1970s. That is, permanent low budget deficits do not 
necessarily lead to better growth performance, if they cause delays in the con- 
struction of infrastructure necessary for further growth. 
Fourth, it is not the initial level of openness measured by the export-GDP 
ratio that accounts for the two-country difference in growth performance, a 
finding also supported by Dervis and Petri (1987). Further, the export-GDP 
ratios in Taiwan and South Korea rose sharply between 1963 and 1973, and 
then had a mild increase with volatile swings between 1974 and 1987. The 
subsequent decline made the two economies only slightly more open in 1991 
than in 1973. 
Both countries have encountered huge current account surpluses since the 
middle of 1980s. They were under pressure from the United States to reduce 
huge trade surpluses with the United States through structural adjustment. In 
response to this pressure, both countries adopted exchange rate appreciation 
5.  This mechanism was developed in the endogenous growth model by Roubini and Sala-i- 
Martin (1992). 
6. According to Shea and Yang’s (1990) estimate, private enterprises in Taiwan borrowed up to 
34 percent of annual funds for investment and operations from the informal financial sector in the 
1964-91 period. 
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Fig. 7.2 Government deficit-GDP ratio 
Sources; Taiwan, Central Government Budget Yearbook (Taipei: Directorate-General of Budget, 
Accounting, and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, various issues); South Korea, In- 
ternariunal Financial Statistics (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, various issues). 
and domestic spending expansion policies to downplay the importance of their 
export-led approaches. As displayed in figures 7.4 and 7.5, both export-GDP 
and current account-GDP ratios have steadily declined since 1987. When eco- 
nomic growth begins to rely more on domestic spending, the discipline on 
macroeconomic policy imposed by an export-led approach will be weaker. If 
our hypothesis is correct, then the decline in the export-GDP ratio will be a 
cause for concern about future macroeconomic performance because the gov- 
ernment will lack external discipline in its policy making. Hence, imposing a 
sufficient set of constraints on both countries’ policy making through the de- 
sign of better institutions or the market mechanism will be crucial for their 
future growth. 
Next we run the growth regressions for the period 1961-92. In general, the 
regression results in table 7.3 did not support the channels necessary to estab- 
lish the link between macroeconomic policy and growth. The Durbin-Watson 
d-statistic has been argued to be a useful diagnostic tool for detecting misspec- 
ification in linear regression. According to the values of the Durbin-Watson 
d-statistics reported in table 7.3, it appears that most of the GDP growth regres- 
sions are not seriously misspecified. Several empirical findings emerged from 
the regression analysis. 
First, unlike empirical results reported in Fischer (1991) and Levine and 
Renelt (1992), the investment-GDP ratio is not a significant factor in account- 
ing for the per capita GDP growth rate over the past three decades in Taiwan 
and South Korea. Figures 7.3B and 7.6B plot the centered five-year moving 
averages of GDP growth rate and investment-GDP ratio since 1970. The plots 
exhibit a negative association between the two variables in each of the two 
decades, which is consistent with the assertion that a high investment-GDP 
ratio does not necessarily lead to better growth performance when investment 
does not have allocative efficiency. 
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Fig. 7.4 Export-GDP ratio 
Sources: See sources for fig. 7.1. 
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Fig. 7.5 Current account-GDP ratio 
Sources; See sources for fig. 7.1. 
Second, real export growth is the only consistently significant variable in all 
the GDP growth regressions. Exports played a key role in accelerating growth 
for the two countries. More precisely, both countries, like Hong Kong and 
Singapore, are fast-growing economies whose growth of exports outpaced that 
of GDP: Taiwan’s (South Korea’s) per capita real export growth rate of 14.9 
percent (12.4 percent) accompanied an average annual growth rate of per cap- 
ita real GDP of 6.5 percent (6.4 percent) over the 1961-92 period. Further, 
according to table 7.3, the statistical relationship between real export growth 
and GDP growth is more robust in Taiwan than it is in South Korea. As clearly 
indicated in the plots of the centered five-year moving averages of GDP growth 
and export growth in figures 7.3C and 7.6C, the fact that the relationship does 
not significantly shift over time generates a more robust statistical relationship 
for Taiwan. However, we cannot know how export growth led to such excellent 
growth performance without imposing and testing structural restrictions on 
export growth and GDP growth. 
Table 7.3 Generalized Regressions of Per Capita GDP Growth Rates 
Inflation Investment/ Deficit/ Export/ Export Foreign 
Eq. Constant Rate GDP GDP GDP Growth AssetdGDP D-W R2 
1 0.08 
2 0.07 
3 0.08 
4 0.07 
5a 0.04 
6 0.08 
7 0.09 
8 0.07 
9" 0.03* 
10 0.07 
I 1  0.09 
12" 0.04 
13 0.08 
14" 0.04 
15 0.09 
16 0.09 
17 0.09 
18" 0.04 
19 0.09 
20 0.07 
21 0.06 
2 2  0.03 
23 0.07 
1 0.08 
2 0.06 
3 0.09 
4 0.06 
5a 0.07 
6 0.09 
7 0.06 
8 0.06 
9" 0.05* 
10 0.18 
11 0.06 
1 2  o m *  
13 0.16 
14" 0.08 
15 0.04 
16 0.04 
17 0.04 
18" 0.03* 
19 0.18 
20 0.07 
21 0.04 
22" 0.05 
23 0.08 
-0.19 
-0.19 
-0.24 
-0.19 
-0.06* 
-0.19 
-0.22 
-0.17* 
-0.07* 
-0.20 
-0.20 
-0.11 
-0.24 
-0.11 
-0.14 
-0.11* 
-0.09* 
-0.09* 
-0.13 
-0.09* 
-0.05* 
-0.09* 
-0.12* 
-0.08* 
-0.02* 
-0.06* 
-0.04* 
-0.09* 
Taiwan (Sample period: 1961-92) 
0.01* 
-0.27' 
-0.03* -0.28* 
-0.06* 
0.04* 
0.02* 
-0.11* -0.32* 
-0.005* -0.39 
-0.03* -0.34* 
-0.10* 
-0.12* 0.06* 
-0.18* 
-0.02* 
-0.12* 
-0.38 
0.23* 
0.03* 
0.26 
0.03* 
0.27 
0.04* 
0.27 
0.26 
0.05* 
0.27 
0.02* 
0.27 
South Korea (Sample period: 1961-92) 
0.07* 
-0.10* 
-0.02* 
0.05* 
-0.28* 
-0.02* 
0.12* 
-0.19* 
0.10* 
0.12* 
-0.02* 
0.09* 
-0.28* 
-0.82 
-0.95 
-1.04 
-1.00 
-0.78* 
-0.85 
- 1.00 
-0.90 
0.07* 
0.10 
0.08* 
0.11 
0.10* 
0.12 
0.09 
0.10* 
0.12 
0.09 
0.10 
1.66 
1.67 
1.76 
1.65 
1.26 
-0.004* 1.68 
1.75 
1.62 
1.26 
-0.004* 1.26 
1.41 
1.41 
-0.002* 1.78 
1.41 
1.67 
1.64 
1.65 
I .28 
0.002* 1.66 
1.60 
I .66 
1.28 
-O.OOO* 1.67 
1.90 
1.89 
1.80 
1.93 
2.09 
0.02* 1.94 
1.83 
1.93 
2.07 
0.08 2.07 
1.92 
2.05 
0.06* 1.97 
2.09 
1.81 
1.81 
1.88 
1.85 
0.08 2.01 
I .72 
1.87 
1.86 
0.03 1.88 
0.09 
0.06 
0.08 
0.08 
0.73 
0.06 
0.05 
0.05 
0.73 
0.73 
0.04 
0.73 
0.02 
0.74 
0.003 
-0.03 
0.02 
0.72 
-0.03 
-0.03 
-0.03 
0.73 
-0.03 
0.04 
0.02 
0.11 
0.05 
0.14 
0.07 
0.12 
0.02 
0.11 
0.16 
0.14 
0.17 
0.16 
0.18 
0.006 
0.14 
0.03 
0.08 
0.12 
0.11 
0.06 
0.09 
0.08 
~~~~~ 
"Sample period is 1964-92. 
*Not significant at 10 percent level. 
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Third, the coefficient estimate for inflation rate has the expected sign in 
each GDP growth regression for both countries. However, the significance of 
inflation rate depends on the measurement of general price level used in the 
regressions. For example, suppose that the consumer price index was used to 
construct the inflation rate series. Then the coefficient estimate for inflation 
rate became insignificant when the per capita export growth rate was included 
in regressions. This suggests that export growth for Taiwan is a more signifi- 
cant factor in accounting for GDP growth than inflation rate is. This result does 
not hold for the implicit GDP deflator. While the use of the implicit GDP de- 
flator has yielded less significant coefficient estimates in South Korea’s regres- 
sions, the relationship between inflation and GDP growth is more robust, as 
displayed in figure 7.6A when the consumer price index was used to construct 
inflation rate. Recently, Fischer (1993) found that the high-inflation outliers in 
his cross-sectional growth regressions did not account for the overall negative 
relationship between inflation and growth. Rather, the negative relationship is 
stronger at low and moderate inflation than at high inflation. However, the two- 
country comparison between Taiwan and South Korea confirms Fischer’s find- 
ing only when the implicit GDP deflator is used. Finally, the export-GDP ratio, 
which measures the openness of an economy, does not have a significant coef- 
ficient estimate in the whole period. 
When international competition forces macroeconomic policy to be clearly 
set within the context of a commitment to growth through export promotion, 
it requires government to surrender its discretionary power in macroeconomic 
policy making. As a result, both macroeconomic policy variables and measures 
of growth performance become endogenous variables. The correlation be- 
tween macroeconomic policy and GDP growth will not be stable across subp- 
eriods because such correlations merely reflect the predominance of some ex- 
ternal shock in the period being considered. This explains why the regression 
outcomes fail to reveal any robust and significant statistical relationships. Re- 
cently, there have been disputes about the mechanism by which a causal factor 
affects the growth performance of the two countries. Some researchers empha- 
size macroeconomic policy as the mechanism, while others cite industrial pol- 
icy. The unstable correlation patterns suggest that it would be difficult (if not 
impossible) to detect any meaningful causal factor using time-series data. 
7.3 Fiscal Policy and Central Bank Independence 
While the regression results indicate that export growth could account for 
GDP growth and that no clear correlation patterns exist between macroeco- 
nomic policy and growth performance, they do not tie down the channel of 
influence, nor the precise role of macroeconomic policy in export-led growth. 
One alternative approach would be imposing structural restrictions on growth 
and macroeconomic policy in econometric models. Then one can use those 
structural restrictions to identify the channel of influence. This approach also 
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resolves the difficulty that a never-ending array of alternative plausible van- 
ables can be entered in the growth regressions. 
The case study approach presents another, though less formal, method of 
characterizing the role of macroeconomic policy in export-led growth. Here 
we adopt this approach to describe the role of fiscal policy and the central bank 
in successful export-led growth. According to table 7.4, the Taiwanese and 
South Korean central banks receive relatively high scores of average legal in- 
dependence compared to those in 16 industrial countries. But their average 
inflation rates in the period 1973-87 were higher than the rates of those coun- 
tries for the following reason. For most developing countries, even though the 
law is explicit as to central bank independence, it cannot be fully implemented 
Table 7.4 Central Bank Independence and Aggregate Performance 
Country 
Switzerland 
Germany 
United States 
Denmark 
Canada 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
Australia 
France 
Sweden 
New Zealand 
Italy 
Spain 
Belgium 
Japan 
Norway 
Chile 
Argentina 
Venezuela 
Mexico 
Taiwan 
Malaysia 
South Korea 
Singapore 
Brazil 
Thailand 
Average Standard Error Per Capita Real 
CBI Indexa Turnover Inflation Inflation GNP Growth Rateh 
(LVAU) Rate (1973-88) (1973-88) (1973-87) 
0.68 
0.66 
0.5 1 
0.47 
0.46 
0.42 
0.3 1 
0.28 
0.27 
0.27 
0.27 
0.22 
0.21 
0.19 
0.16 
0.14 
0.49 
0.44 
0.37 
0.36 
0.34 
0.34 
0.32 
0.27 
0.26 
0.26 
Developed Countries 
0.13 3.1 
0.10 3.4 
0.13 6.4 
0.05 8.6 
0.10 7.2 
0.05 4.3 
0.10 6.7 
n.a. 9.5 
0.15 8.2 
0.15 8.3 
0.15 12.2 
0.08 12.5 
0.20 12.4 
0.13 6.0 
0.20 4.5 
0.08 8.2 
0.45 51.8 
0.93 356.7 
0.30 12.7 
0.15 50.2 
0.23 7.2 
0.13 5.1 
0.43 10.9 
0.37 5.4 
n.a. 273.3 
0.20 8.0 
Developing Countries 
2.1 1.4 
2.0 1.8 
3.3 1.6 
3.3 1.1 
2.8 2.8 
3.2 1.1 
4.8 2.0 
2.7 I .4 
3.5 1.5 
2.8 1.5 
3.2 0.7 
5.4 2.9 
4.7 I .2 
3.4 1.5 
4.1 2.6 
2.4 3.0 
59.1 0.7 
253.5 -0.5 
7.5 -0.3 
39.3 1.2 
9.9 6.5 
4.4 3.7 
9.3 7.2 
7.9 6.1 
203.9 2.4 
6.9 4.9 
"LVAU = Unweighted aggregation of legal variables. Scores for central bank independence, ex- 
cept that for Taiwan, are from Cukierman (1992). 
bNumbers in developing countries are per capita real GDP growth rates. 
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because the government tends to do things that may not be in strict accordance 
with the law. To reduce such bias, we use the actual turnover rate of the bank 
president proposed by Cukierman (1992) as an alternative measure. The turn- 
over rates in both Taiwan and South Korea are higher than in the developed 
countries on the list in table 7.4, a result consistent with their inflationary per- 
formance. 
A single index cannot characterize the dynamic relationship between central 
bank independence and the export-led approach, such as the ways in which 
the central bank resolves its conflicts with the executive branch when export- 
promoting policy affects price stability. According to Taiwanese central bank 
law, the objectives of central bank operations are (1) promoting financial stabil- 
ity, (2) ensuring the health of the banking system, (3) maintaining the stable 
purchasing power of its currency, and (4) assisting economic development 
without compromising the above three goals. Price stability is not the only ob- 
jective. 
The board of directors of Taiwan’s central bank is responsible for the review 
of monetary and exchange rate policies. The ministers of finance and economic 
affairs are both permanent and voting members of the board, and the bank’s 
president must attend the weekly cabinet meeting. Requests for more coopera- 
tion from the central bank in promoting export growth are often raised in the 
meetings. Even though central bank law requires the board to have regular 
meetings, the bank’s president usually convenes the board meeting after im- 
portant decisions on monetary and exchange rate policies have been made. 
The central bank’s president occasionally testifies before the parliament at the 
request of a member of the parliament. The parliament has no say in the formu- 
lation and conduct of monetary and exchange rate policies, and the central 
bank does not hold any regular public hearings. These facts taken together put 
the central bank under the control of the executive branch of government. 
Although central bank law did not explicitly ban government and state- 
owned enterprises from soliciting loans or advances from the central bank in 
Taiwan, the central bank did not extend such loans or advances after the great 
1945-49 inflation.’ However, the latest amendment of the central government 
bond issuance law in 1991 allows the central bank to directly purchase govern- 
ment bonds from their issuer, the Ministry of Finance (i.e., the monetization of 
public debts), with the parliament’s approval.* This amendment has attracted 
attention because budget deficits have increased dramatically during recent 
years. If massive corruption in Taiwan’s infrastructure construction and public 
7. In the 1970s, the central bank even held a huge number of shares of a private company, Hwa- 
Long Polyester Co., after it rescued the company from bankruptcy using inflationary tax revenues 
under directives from some very high level government officials. 
8. Initially, the executive branch wanted the amendment that the central bank can directly pur- 
chase government bonds without any consent from the parliament. However, this met with strong 
resistance from the opposition party. Both sides eventually compromised on this issue by adding 
the parliamentary approval precondition. 
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investment projects and the surge in civil service salaries continue, any future 
accelerating increase in budget deficits will put more pressure on the central 
bank to monetize the public debt.9 In other words, fiscal policy is vital to the 
central bank's ability to maintain price stability. 
On the other hand, South Korean central bank law explicitly states that one 
of the central bank's objectives is employing all feasible means to promote 
economic development. To assure this, the minister of finance not only presides 
over the monetary committee of the Bank of Korea, which is responsible for 
the design of monetary and credit policies, but also nominates the committee 
members. When a resolution of the committee is in conflict with the executive 
branch's position, the minister of finance can ask the committee to reconsider 
the resolution. Even if the committee refuses, the minister can bring the case 
to the country's president for the final decision. This puts the Bank of Korea 
under the direct control of the Ministry of Finance. The Bank of Korea is also 
allowed to directly purchase government bonds from the government, extend 
loans or advances to the government, and even hold government-guaranteed 
securities. The upper limit on the total balance of unpaid public debt, loans, 
and advances is set by the National Assembly. 
Given that both central banks lack independence in operation, the most im- 
portant factor that accounts for moderate and more stable inflation in both 
countries is the commitment to an export-led approach. For such an approach, 
the optimal policies are those maintaining and enhancing the international 
competitiveness of export goods. This commitment in turn imposes a set of 
constraints on macroeconomic policy that prevents the adoption of measures 
antithetical to export growth.'" Other factors include the following: (1) the ob- 
jectives in policy making must be well defined and easy to measure, ( 2 )  the 
costs of wrong policy making must be visible fairly rapidly, and (3) the degree 
of freedom in the feasible set of instruments must be sufficient for achieving 
any policy objective. When a decline in export growth is caused by significant 
mistakes in policy making, it makes the costs of mistakes highly visible to 
policymakers and private agents and therefore quickly puts pressure on govern- 
ment authorities to promptly adjust policy. 
9. For example, the construction of the second northern Taiwan highway started in 1986 and is 
planned to be completed in 1997, with four years' delay. The original budget for this 120-km 
highway was NT$58. I billion. However, the budget was inflated to an estimated NT$176.8 billion 
in 1993. During the period 1986-93, Taiwan did not experience very serious inflation problems, 
so inflation was not the reason for the surge in the budget. Massive conuption in the KuoMingTang 
(KMT) regime may be the explanation. Another example is the Taipei Mass Rail Transit System. 
The original estimate of NT$250 billion was nearly doubled to about NT$480 billion in 1993. 
Civil service salaries are also a major item of budgetary expenditure; they amounted to 3 1.8 per- 
cent of the total budget at all levels of governments in FY 1993. It has been difficult to cut this 
budgetary expenditure since civil servants and military personnel have bcen strong supporters of 
the KMT regime over the past four decades. 
10. It is not clear why the governments in both countries decided to switch to an export-led 
approach in the 1960s. Balassa (1988) describes Taiwan's decision to adopt an export-led approach 
as an experiment. 
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Fig. 7.7 Government spending-GDP ratio 
Sources: See sources for fig. 7.2. 
Figure 7.7 shows that government spending was kept under tight control in 
the period 1961-90, even with large budget surpluses in the 1970s for Taiwan." 
South Korean budget deficits in the 1970s were mainly caused by generous tax 
breaks and fiscal incentives provided in its industrial targeting policy. The bud- 
get deficits returned to normal in the 1980s. On the other hand, both the six- 
year national development plan and the surge in civil service salaries contrib- 
uted to huge budget deficits in Taiwan for FY 1990, 1991, and 1992. The 
government spending-GDP ratio began to climb in the 1980s, with a clearer 
upward trend in Taiwan. The upward trend shows that both countries began to 
use government spending as an instrument to stimulate the economy. Tight 
budgetary control means that governments do not have to resort to inflationary 
tax revenues as a source of funds. 
For Taiwan and South Korea, sound fiscal discipline plays two roles in 
export-led growth: (1) It gives the set of instruments the maximum degree of 
freedom in achieving the export growth goal. (2) It allows the central bank to 
be more flexible in promoting exports without immediately jeopardizing price 
stability. The set of instruments for implementing macroeconomic policy in- 
cludes monetary bases, interest rates, credit allocation, government spending, 
tax rates, and exchange rates. However, not all of them are free instruments in 
achieving any particular policy goal. The degree of freedom depends on the 
combination of monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies the government 
actually adopts. For example, if a government persistently runs budget deficits 
and the central bank collects inflationary tax revenues for the government, it is 
unlikely that government authorities can use export financing subsidies or fis- 
cal incentives to maintain export profitability without generating higher gov- 
11. Since both Taiwan and South Korea gave national security top priority in deciding their 
annual budgets, the national defense budgets occupied a significant portion of central government 
spending. Hence, the government expenditure-GDP ratio would not be as high as first thought 
once this factor is taken into account. 
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ernment deficits and inflation. That is, they cannot be free instruments in main- 
taining export profitability. 
As argued in Sargent and Wallace (1981), for a given path of government 
budget deficits, tighter monetary policy lowers inflation today but at the cost 
of higher inflation in the future. That is, the central bank cannot effectively 
implement a tight monetary policy to bring inflation under control without 
considering the behavior of government budget deficits. On the other hand, 
Alesina (1989), Bade and Parkin (1985), and Parkin (1986) found that devel- 
oped countries with independent central banks experience significantly lower 
inflation than developed countries whose central banks are under the control 
of the executive branch of government. As suggested in Alesina and Summers 
( 1993), central bank independence might improve macroeconomic perfor- 
mance through two channels: (1) An independent central bank that is free from 
political pressure may behave more predictably, promoting economic stability 
and reducing risk premia in real interest rates. ( 2 )  To the extent that high infla- 
tion has adverse effects on economic performance either by creating distor- 
tions, encouraging rent-seeking activities, or raising risk premia, one would 
expect central bank independence to improve economic performance. The time 
inconsistency theory of inflation of the type developed in Kydland and Prescott 
(1977) also concludes that a more independent central bank could reduce the 
inflation rate. 
Since the central bank has its most pervasive influence on inflation, interest 
rates, exchange rates, and the balance of payments, through the conduct of 
monetary and exchange rate policies, the main objective of most central banks 
in developed countries has been confined to maintaining price stability. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the two potentially conflicting roles of central 
banks in developing countries often make it difficult for them to maintain their 
independence. However, it is sound fiscal policy, not central bank indepen- 
dence, that accounted for moderate and more stable inflation in both Taiwan 
and South Korea. 
As the export-GDP ratio continues to decline and the economy matures, 
government spending will become an important instrument because economic 
growth will rely more on domestic spending, and economic and social stability 
becomes the goal.'* If higher government deficits are expected as a conse- 
quence of more aggressive government spending, a less independent central 
bank will be a cause of concern because a less independent central bank makes 
the monetization of public debt easier. Therefore, designing an independent 
central bank could be crucial for both countries' future economic performance. 
12. Dervis and Petri (1987) also found that countries at the bottom end of the expenditure range 
in their cross-country sample generally increased their government spending, while countries at 
the top end decreased theira. 
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7.4 Special Loan Policy 
Although international competition imposes constraints on macroeconomic 
policy, optimal macroeconomic policy differs across the two countries, de- 
pending on the structure of the economy. The Taiwanese government has con- 
fined its role to providing infrastructure and other public goods. It used 
medium-term economic planning that set development targets, and those plans 
were generally indicative. The interactions between the economic bureaucracy 
and the private sector can be characterized as mutual adjustment rather than 
collaboration. 
Even though small and medium-sized enterprises accounted for more than 
two-thirds of Taiwan’s total exports, the government did not offer generous spe- 
cific incentives to them. Since most of these firms cannot supply the informa- 
tion necessary to issue their own notes or publicly traded shares, the banking 
system and unregulated financial sector are their main sources of funds. Inter- 
est rate subsidies and preferential loans are probably the most important 
export-promoting instruments. The central bank offers export financing 
through state-owned commercial banks and specialized banks. Table 7.5 shows 
the significant difference between the rediscount rate on export loans and the 
regular rediscount rate. While export-financing policy increases the intema- 
tional competitiveness of exports by reducing borrowing costs, inflationary 
pressure is built up with export activities as long as funds for investment and 
business operations are scarce in the export sector and the export loan rate is 
lower than the market interest rate. As a result, a negative association exists 
between inflation rate and rediscount rate on export loans. When the economy 
encountered serious inflationary problems in 1974 and 1980, the central bank 
was forced to raise the rediscount rate on export loans. On the other hand, 
when the economy’s export growth slows, the central bank lowers the redis- 
count rate on export loans to stimulate exports only if it will not immediately 
threaten price stability. 
The central bank also set up a medium- and long-term credit special fund to 
finance infrastructure construction and investment projects in 1973. The source 
of funds is deposits of the postal saving system (PSS) at the central bank. Un- 
der the industrial targeting policy, the central bank extended preferential loans 
to qualified firms through commercial and specialized banks to promote ma- 
chine imports. For example, it offered U.S.$600 million in preferential loans 
for financing major strategic export industries and technology-intensive indus- 
tries in 1978. After extending those special loans, banks can apply for special 
rediscounts at the window of the central bank. 
In the late 1970s and 1980s, huge trade surpluses and inappropriate ex- 
change rate management forced the central bank to hold huge foreign exchange 
reserves. The special loan policy was criticized for its inflationary effects. 
When this policy posed a threat to price stability, the central bank abandoned 
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Table 7.5 Principal Interest Rates on Central Bank Loans and Discounts 
(% per annum) 
Taiwan South Korea 
Rediscounts on Discounts for Loans for Loans to 
Year Rediscounts Export Loans Commercial Bills” Exportsb Government 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
9.25 
8.50 
10.75 
12.00 
10.75 
9.50 
8.25 
8.25 
11.00 
11 .oo 
11.75 
7.75 
7.25 
6.75 
5.25 
4.50 
4.50 
4.50 
7.75 
7.75 
6.25 
5.625 
5.50 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
8.75 
8.00 
6.00 
6.00 
5.50 
5.50 
9.50 
9.50 
10.00 
7.25 
7.00 
6.75 
5.25 
4.50 
4.50 
4.50 
7.75 
7.75 
6.25 
5.875 
- 
28.0 
28.0 
28.0-23.0 
23.0-22.0 
22.0-19.0 
19.0-16.0 
16.0-1 1.0 
9.0 
9.0 
9.0-13.0 
13.0 
9.0-14.0 
9.0-14.5 
14.5 
20.5-15.5 
14.5-10.5 
6.5-5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0-7.0 
7.0 
8.0-7.0 
7.0 
7.0 
7.0 
5.0 
7.0-8.0 
3.5 
3.5 
3.5 
3.5 
3.5 
3.5 
3.5 
3.5 
3.5 
3.5 
3.5 
3.5 
4.0 
4.0 
10.0 
10.0 
5 .0 
5 .O 
5 .O 
5 .O 
7 .O 
7.0 
8.0 
7.0 
7.0 
7.0 
7.0 
5.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
5 .0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5 .O 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
Sources: Monthly Statisfical Bulletin (Seoul: Bank of Korea, various issues); Financial Srafisfics 
Monrhly, Taiwan Disrric?, R.O.C. (Taipei: Central Bank of China, various issues). 
‘Discounts on commercial bills from August 3, 1972, to March 29, 1982, are rates for prime enter- 
prises. 
bIncludes loans for general exports and imports, loans for exports of construction and services, 
and loans for export preparation of agricultural and marine products. 
it in the middle of 1989. Since a government budget deficit cannot have been 
a source of inflation during this period, export booms, together with this spe- 
cial loan policy, appear to account for moderate inflation in Taiwan. 
On the other hand, South Korea established a powerful agency, the Korean 
Planning Board, that controls instruments for implementing economic plan- 
ning and heavily intervened in the allocation of resources. The government 
provides domestic market protection, implements industrial targeting, issues 
permits of entry in many industries, and guarantees foreign loans for private 
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firms. In general, the government acted as a partner in industrial targeting. 
“Korea, Inc.” is an adequate description of the relation between government 
and big private enterprises. 
In the 1980s, five large state-owned banks accounted for nearly all formal 
commercial credit. The banking system and the central bank were used to 
channel domestic and foreign savings or supply credits to the chaebols. The 
composition of special loans and discounts of the Bank of Korea in table 7.6 
suggests a close partnership between government and the chaebols. Unlike the 
Table 7.6 Special Loans and Discounts of Central Banks 
Taiwan South Korea 
(million NT dollars) (billion won) 
Special Preferential General Rediscounts on 
Year Discountsa Loansb Loans Commercial Bills 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
4,458 (44.1) 
5,267 (45.2) 
6,866 (49.3) 
6,651 (46.1) 
7,173 (49.7) 
8,195 (49.9) 
7,298 (43.0) 
24,552 (57.8) 
40,258 (60.9) 
44,814 (57.2) 
35,605 (35.3) 
34,740 (21.6) 
37,218 (15.5) 
59,494 (21.1) 
82,252 (28.6) 
106,400 (55.7) 
166,683 (73.6) 
120,561 (66.5) 
89,330 (73.2) 
39,895 (74.1) 
48,800 (84.6) 
8,500 (92.0) 
700 (0.6) 
53,733 (93.7) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
4 
8 
14 
32 
48 
71 
100 
216 
308 
3 80 
46 1 
457 
775 
1,002 
1,533 
1,713 
1,750 
1,739 
1,786 
2,044 
1,927 
1,133 
527 
639 
892 
986 
I ,03 1 
1,055 
0.3 
- 
- 
- 
21 
6 
34 
8 
214 
167 
127 
131 
153 
620 
396 
870 
1,210 
2,258 
3,976 
5,463 
6,116 
7,144 
6,417 
5,921 
5,968 
6,093 
6,138 
6,570 
- 
- 
1.2 
2 
16 
23 
39 
44 
90 
102 
73 
75 
82 
168 
297 
593 
960 
955 
1,063 
1.32 1 
1,292 
1,620 
1,862 
2,588 
3,820 
5,488 
5,873 
5,178 
Sources: Monthly Statistical Bulletin (Seoul: Bank of Korea, various issues); Financial Statistics 
Monthly, Taiwan Districr, R.O.C. (Taipei: Central Bank of China, various issues). 
“Special discounts in Taiwan have been ceased in April 1989. Numbers in parentheses are special 
discounts as a percentage of total claims of the central bank on depository institutions. 
bF’referential loans consist of loans for foreign trade and loans on collateral of export bills. 
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case in Taiwan, general loans extended by the Bank of Korea constituted the 
major component of its special loans and discounts. Those loans were allo- 
cated to specific borrowers under the industrial targeting policy. Table 7.5 also 
shows that commercial bank credit was offered at very low interest rates. Since 
the funds were strictly rationed, households and small and medium-sized busi- 
nesses were forced into the informal financial sector, where lending rates ex- 
ceeded bank loan rates by 20 percent or more. 
Like most countries in the early stages of economic development, the gap 
between investment and domestic saving had to be filled with international 
borrowing. Nearly three-quarters of investment in the late 1950s and about half 
in the 1960s was financed from abroad. Before 1965, U.S. aid constituted a 
significant external financing source, which was channeled into private invest- 
ment through government saving. As U.S. aid began to decline, the South Ko- 
rean government first attempted to generate domestic saving as a main source 
of funds for investment finance. The government decided to undertake an inter- 
est rate reform in 1965 that was designed to channel household saving into 
investment finance through the regulated financial sector by offering positive 
real interest rates on deposits. The M2-GDP ratio rose substantially during the 
period 1965-72, reflecting an increase in the supply of funds through deposi- 
tory institutions. When the HCI program was launched in the 1970s, the South 
Korean government was under constant pressure from chaebols to lower real 
interest rates, and the country entered the negative interest rate era on August 
3, 1972. The idea of channeling household saving into investment finance 
through depository institutions was then abandoned. The enormous difference 
in real interest rates between the regulated financial sector and its unregulated 
counterpart induced most household saving into the unregulated sector. The 
limited loanable funds in the regulated financial sector were strictly rationed 
to selected chaebols at negative real interest rates. As a result, the South Ko- 
rean M2-GDP ratio has not risen since the middle of 1970s, and South Korea 
had to rely on international borrowing to finance its investment projects. South 
Korea’s foreign borrowing assumed equal importance with government saving. 
Even though South Korea borrowed more extensively than Taiwan and other 
Asian developing countries, it maintained good control over its foreign debt. 
As shown in figure 7.8, Taiwan became a creditor in the late 1970s, while 
South Korea has been a debtor over the past three decades. However, net for- 
eign asset-GDP ratios in both countries share similar trend properties. 
To maintain negative real interest rates, the South Korean central bank had 
to tightly control the regulated financial sector. In the early 1980s, when the 
cost of capital rose abroad and foreign debt threatened to grow out of control, 
the South Korean government lifted the market entry restriction on contractual 
saving institutions to stimulate household and corporate saving. Those institu- 
tions, offering higher and safer returns than the unregulated financial sector, 
drew new funds into the regulated financial sector and evidently also increased 
the net flow of funds. 
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Fig. 7.8 Foreign asset-GDP ratio 
Sources: See sources for fig. 7. I .  
The special loan policies adopted by each of the two central banks reflects 
the difference in industrial organization between Taiwan and South Korea. 
Since firms in the Taiwanese export sector are small and medium-sized, the 
export financing policy, which was based solely on export activities, played an 
important role in the allocation of credit. Under this structure, direct interven- 
tion in allocating the funds for investment finance was not possible. This uni- 
form incentive on the basis of export performance is a more efficient method 
of export promotion. Although Taiwan's planning agency cannot select technol- 
ogy with increasing returns, as its South Korean counterpart did, Taiwan's 
growth performance drew on a large pool of experienced entrepreneurs and 
human resources. For South Korea, the partnership between government and 
the chaebols created moral hazard problems. Under the industrial targeting in 
the 1970s, the chaebols were heavily leveraged with loan guarantees through 
state-owned banks, and the government in turn held responsibility for the fail- 
ure of the chaebols' investment projects. The bailout certainty provided by the 
Bank of Korea through inflationary tax revenues induced excessive risk taking. 
Even after many efforts, the government has not been able to extricate itself 
from its relations with the chaebols. 
7.5 Current Account and Exchange Rate Policy 
The current account is the excess of saving over investment. Since saving 
and investment are outcomes of intertemporal decisions by households, firms, 
and government, current account behavior is best analyzed in an intertemporal 
macroeconomic model, and expectations of future events can be a decisive 
factor in determining its behavior. 
Time-series data on saving, investment, and current account for Taiwan and 
South Korea are shown in Figures 7.9A and 7.9B. The current account-GDP 
ratio fluctuates around mean zero for South Korea, while it exhibits an upward 
trend for Taiwan. Different investment and saving behavior in the two countries 
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accounts for the difference: the investment-GDP and saving-GDP ratios move 
in concert for South Korea. But saving-GDP movement dominates current 
account-GDP movement for Taiwan. 
Since most capital goods were imported in the early stages of economic 
development, domestic saving can be channeled into investment finance only 
to the extent that it can be translated into availability of foreign exchange. With 
limited capacity to repay their foreign debts, Taiwan and South Korea were 
forced to transform domestic saving into foreign exchange in the 1950s. But 
they demonstrated that rapid growth of manufactured exports was an alterna- 
tive solution to the foreign exchange shortage in the early 1960s. Although the 
export-led approach emphasizes the importance of the "right" real exchange 
rate in promoting exports, the export success of these two countries was not a 
product of aggressive devaluations. That is, they performed well, not because 
they devalued aggressively to achieve the "right" real exchange rate, but rather 
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0 
because international competition disciplined macroeconomic policy so that 
the real exchange rate was "right" for export-led growth. 
Taiwan and South Korea had different exchange rate policies because they 
took different approaches to domestic monetary policy. In the 1960s and 
1970s, South Korea experienced inflation as a consequence of an improved 
balance of payments and an expansionary monetary policy. Once more rapid 
inflation at home than abroad decreased the real exchange rate, the government 
was forced to adopt an aggressive devaluation policy to  offset the effects of 
inflation on the real exchange rates during 1960-80 as displayed in figure 
7.1 OB. That is, exchange rate adjustment is not a free instrument under an ex- 
pansionary domestic monetary policy. As a result, the exchange rate of won 
per U.S. dollar increased from 124.8 in 1961 to 607.4 in 1980. On the other 
hand, Taiwan adopted a restrictive monetary policy in the 1960s and 1970s. 
\ 1 
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Figure 7.10A shows that when Taiwan encountered current account surplus 
problems in the period 1971-73 and 1976-79, only periodic adjustments of 
nominal exchange rates were necessary to maintain a realistic real exchange 
rate. 
Even though the export-led approach takes advantage of opportunities for 
international trade, it also exposes the economy to external shocks. To insulate 
the domestic economy, most central banks hold foreign exchange reserves as 
an instrument to absorb the impact of external shocks on the economy. An 
appropriate level of foreign exchange reserves also enables the government to 
use better fiscal incentives to restore the external competitiveness of its exports 
when there is a temporary decrease in exports caused by external shocks. 
For a small open economy with perfect mobility, investment, saving, and 
current account depend on the real interest rate in the world credit market. In 
theory, any pattern of correlation between investment and saving is possible, 
depending on shocks affecting the economy. However, this observation does 
not mean that investment is uncorrelated with saving over time. A prime instru- 
ment for a country to use in achieving its foreign reserve objectives is regula- 
tory restriction of capital inflows and outflows. With imperfect capital mobility, 
a boom in investment opportunities will be financed less by foreign capital 
inflows and more by domestic saving induced by higher domestic interest rates. 
Hence, more imperfect capital mobility leads to a higher correlation between 
investment and saving. This may explain the positive correlation between in- 
vestment and saving for South Korea, but offers no explanation for the almost 
zero correlation for Taiwan. 
Overly large foreign reserves could cause a concern about the economy’s 
long-run prospects when it results from imbalance between saving and invest- 
ment. For example, when Taiwan’s current account had huge surpluses in the 
1980% the central bank accumulated substantial foreign exchange reserves. As 
displayed in figures 7.5 and 7.1 1, the current account-GDP ratio increased 
from 1.5 percent in 1981 to 22.3 percent in 1986, while the foreign reserve- 
GDP ratio jumped from 17.0 percent in 1986 to 70.3 percent in 1987. Even 
the political uncertainties faced by Taiwan cannot justify the amount of foreign 
reserves held by the Taiwanese central bank in the 1980s (see fig. 7.11). Huge 
current account surpluses also signify serious misallocation of resources in the 
economy. Since private saving and private investment are outcomes of inter- 
temporal decisions, the government can either change the decision environ- 
ment in the private sector or use fiscal expansion to correct such misallocation. 
The government in Taiwan began a series of adjustments, such as import 
liberalization, currency appreciation, government spending expansion, and the 
relaxation of outward exchange controls. Among them,currency appreciation 
is the most important adjustment measure taken by the government. Taiwan’s 
central bank began to appreciate NT dollars in September 1985 under U.S. 
pressure. It ran a controlled crawling appreciation at a rate of NT$O.Ol per day 
(about 7.8 percent per year) until December 1986. Then the adjustment took a 
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Fig. 7.11 Foreign reserve-GDP ratio 
Sources: See sources for fig. 7.1. 
less regular pace. Appreciation stopped for most of February 1987, but subse- 
quent irregular appreciation brought the rate to NT$33.53 to U.S.$l by the end 
of April 1987. Since the expected appreciation rate exceeded the 2 percent 
interest differentials in favor of the United States, the arbitrage opportunity 
attracted a flood of hot money despite tight controls still imposed on capital 
inflow. To maintain financial stability in Taiwan, the central bank imposed re- 
strictions on the maximum amount of foreign liabilities that can be held by 
each bank in July 1987.13 By the fourth quarter of 1989 the extent of apprecia- 
tion had reached 26 percent. The nominal NT-U.S. dollar exchange rate ap- 
preciated from 29.9 in 1985 to 25.4 in 1992. Taiwan’s nominal exchange rate 
had appreciated 60 percent in seven years. Although the central bank defended 
its appreciation policy on the grounds that small and medium-sized firms need 
longer periods of time to make necessary adjustments, the central bank under 
this policy incurred a huge capital loss in foreign reserves. As displayed in 
table 7.7, the central bank was the most profitable state-owned enterprise in 
Taiwan before 1986. Under this appreciation policy, the annual before-tax 
profit of the central bank shrank from NT$38.2 billion in FY 1986 to NT$1.7 
billion in FY 1987. It is easy to conclude that currency appreciation is not 
optimal because (1) it is not an effective policy in changing the decision envi- 
ronment of the private sector, and (2) the capital loss and opportunity costs 
incurred in holding such huge foreign reserves are significant. 
This substantial capital inflow handicapped the central bank in its pursuit of 
price stability. As clearly shown in table 7.8, the sharp increase in foreign re- 
serves during the period 1980-88 caused increases in the monetary base 
(reserve money). To insulate the money supply from this increase in the mone- 
tary base, the central bank raised the reserve requirement for the banking sys- 
13. More seriously, as hot money poured into the Taiwanese stock market, the Taiwan stock 
price index rapidly increased from 839.73 (base year 1966 = 100) in  January 1986 to 12,495.34 
in February 1990. During this period, about one-tenth of the population in Taiwan participated in 
stock market activities. 
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Table 7.7 Before-Tax Net Profit of Taiwan Central Bank (million NT dollars) 
Fiscal Year 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
I987 
I988 
I989 
I990 
1991 
I992 
Central Bank 
15,404 
17,458 
31,961 
38,541 
38,240 
47,844 
38,184 ( I  0,000) 
1,704 (43,560) 
2,263 (47,873) 
2,784 (64,774) 
2,434 (62,480) 
9,603 (41,367) 
13,352 (26,104) 
CPC TPC 
-685 11,627 
2,784 17,232 
5,504 19,235 
8.138 17,234 
22,580 22.118 
19,470 32,543 
30,668 27,987 
52,204 34,733 
59.954 35,964 
64,874 33,784 
33,822 29,263 
22,483 31,150 
23,367 33,741 
SOWZYS: Yeurbook of Financial Statistics, Taiwan District, R.O.C. (Taipei: Central Bank of China, 
1992); Income Stutement of Central Bank, Eiwan District, R.O.C. (Taipei: Central Bank of 
China, 1993). 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are capital losses of foreign reserves. CPC: China Petroleum Co., 
Ltd. TPC: Taiwan Power Co.. Ltd. 
Table 7.8 Changes in Monetary Base (% per annum) 
Year Monetary Base Net Foreign Asset Net Domestic Asset 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
22.4 
8.5 
16.0 
13.4 
14.7 
28.9 
27. I 
26.5 
32.5 
0.2 
9.2 
88.3 
16.6 
54.6 
53.9 
77.1 
234.9 
192.1 
5.3 
- 1.8 
-10.1 
26.7 
-66.0 
-8.1 
-38.6 
-40.0 
-63.0 
- 196.0 
- 165.0 
21.2 
34.2 
10.3 
- 15.5 
Source: Financial Statistics Monthly, Taiwan District, R.O.C. (Taipei: Central Bank of China, vari- 
ous issues). 
tem in 1988 (table 7.9), and it increased open market operations in order to 
stabilize the level of monetary base. Another instrument used by the central 
bank were the deposits replaced by the PSS. For example, the deposits replaced 
by the PSS accounted for the 80 percent of total deposits in the PSS. It is not 
surprising that depository institutions held a large portion of their required 
reserves in T-bills, saving bonds, and certificates of deposit. Tables 7.8 and 7.9 
indicated that those policies kept the monetary base under control. 
Import protection was reduced in late 1986. For example, the complex sys- 
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Table 7.9 Reserve Requirements for Commercial Banks 
Demand Deposits Time Deposits 
Taiwan South Korea Taiwan South Korea 
1971 30 
1972 30 
1973 30 
1974 30 
1975 23 
1976 23 
1977 23 
1978 28 
1979 23 
1980 23 
1981 23 
1982 21 
1983 21 
1984 21 
1985 21 
1986 21 
1987 21 
1988 23 
1989 27 
1990 26.5 
1991 25.25 
1992 25.25 
1993 24.25 
18 
19 
22 
19 
24 
24 
24 
27 
27 
14 
3.5 
5.5 
5.5 
4.5 
4.5 
4.5 
7.0 
10.0 
10.0 
11.5 
11.5 
11.5 
11.5 
17 
17 
17 
14 
13 
13 
13 
13 
11 
11 
11 
11 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
11 
13 
12 
11.25 
10.875 
10.125 
12 
14 
18 
15 
17 
17 
17 
20 
20 
10 
3.5 
5.5 
5.5 
4.5 
4.5 
4.5 
7.0 
10.0 
10.0 
11.5 
11.5 
11.5 
11.5 
Sources: Monrhly Statistical Bulletin (Seoul: Bank of Korea, various issues); Financial Statistics 
Monrhlv, Taiwan District, R.O.C. (Taipei: Central Bank of China, various issues). 
Note: In 1988, the marginal reserve ratio for both demand and time deposits is 30 percent for 
South Korea, which is the ratio applied to the increment of each half-monthly average deposits 
compared with the first halfmonthly average deposits of April 1989. 
tem by which imports were valued for the purpose of assessing customs duties 
was simplified in August 1986, and the average tariff rate fell to 13.0 percent 
in 1988 and 10.3 percent in 1989. The Taiwanese government has planned 
further reductions in tariffs with the following goals: average tariff rates be- 
tween 0 and 5 percent for raw materials, maximum 10 percent tariff rate on 
intermediate products, and about 20 percent on final goods. 
Like Taiwan, South Korea relied on U.S. aid and military procurement to 
fill most of its foreign exchange requirements until the late 1950s. Because 
some U.S. payments were tied to local services valued in local currency, there 
was a strong incentive to overvalue the won. The won is estimated to have been 
overvalued by a factor of two. After the South Korean government adopted an 
export-led approach in the early 1960s, there were two devaluations to solve 
the overvaluation problem. Most effects of the first devaluation were offset by 
inflation, and the second devaluation was followed by the adoption of a man- 
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aged float exchange system. This system remained in effect until 1974, when 
South Korea decided to undertake the HCI plan. 
Unlike Taiwan, South Korean domestic saving was not sufficient to finance 
all investment projects, and hence extensive borrowing abroad was needed to 
accelerate Korea’s development in the 1970s. In the first half of the 1980s, 
the international debt crisis raised the concern that South Korea might have 
overborrowed. Unlike the adjustment programs in most Latin American coun- 
terparts, the adjustment program implemented between 1980 and 198 1 quickly 
restored growth, lowered the inflation rate, and reduced current account defi- 
cits. This adjustment program included a large devaluation and sharply con- 
tractionary monetary policy. The adjustment was successful because invest- 
ment in the export sector generated the necessary capacity to repay foreign 
debt. 
When a country experiences a temporary favorable external shock, the gov- 
ernment of the country can choose between using current account surpluses to 
retire foreign debt or using the surpluses to acquire foreign reserves. Since 
Taiwan does not borrow extensively abroad or allow its citizens to hold foreign 
assets, the only option is to accumulate foreign reserves when a favorable tem- 
porary external shock occurs. On the other hand, since South Korea has a large 
foreign debt, it has the additional option of retiring foreign debt using current 
account surpluses. The South Korean government, under pressure, began to 
use exchange rate management to solve the problem of current account sur- 
pluses. The won appreciated only 5 percent against the U.S. dollar between 
the middle of 1986 and April 1987. But the won appreciated another 21 percent 
against the U.S. dollar before it depreciated again in 1989. Further, according 
to figure 7.10B, the exchange rate policy appears to partially account for 
current account-GDP movement in the 1980s. Other adjustments, such as im- 
port liberalization and expenditure expansion policies, also account for current 
account movement. For example, official figures indicate that the average tariff 
was lowered from 23.4 percent in 1983 to 19.3 percent in 1987, 18.1 percent 
in 1988, and 12.7 percent in 1989. The government planned further reductions 
in tariff rates by 1993. It also dismantled the import surveillance system that 
threatened protectionist action in the event that imports of certain commodities 
reached particular levels. As a result, the current account returned to deficit in 
1990, while foreign exchange reserves stayed fairly stable without any signifi- 
cant trend. 
7.6 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we studied the role of macroeconomic policy in export-led 
growth. When a government adopts an export-led approach, international com- 
petition forces government policy to be clearly set within the context of a com- 
mitment to growth through exporting. Thus macroeconomic policy is forced 
to react optimally to any external shock. This may explain why regression re- 
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sults do not easily reveal any robust and significant statistical relationships 
between macroeconomic policy and growth for Taiwan and South Korea. Two 
issues remain to be resolved: first, the links between export growth and eco- 
nomic growth, and second, the mechanism under which a government is will- 
ing to fully commit itself to an export-led approach. One possible answer to 
the second issue is that once rapid growth begins, there is widespread accep- 
tance of the export-led approach among private agents. This acceptance further 
enhances the credibility of the export-led approach. 
In the case study, we argued that fiscal discipline not only gives macroeco- 
nomic policy instruments the maximum degree of freedom in achieving export 
growth goals but also allows the central bank to be more flexible in promoting 
exports without immediately jeopardizing its price stability goal. However, 
when the importance of the export-led approach as a source of growth begins 
to decline, government spending will become an important instrument because 
economic growth will depend more on domestic spending, and economic and 
social stability will become a social goal. A less independent central bank will 
be a cause of concern because it makes inflationary finance easier. Therefore, 
designing an independent central bank could be crucial for the future economic 
performance of both Taiwan and South Korea. 
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Comment Amina Tyabji 
This paper examines the role of macroeconomic policy in the successful 
export-led growth of two first-tier East Asian newly industrialized economies 
(NIEs), namely, Taiwan and South Korea (hereafter Korea). The main thrust of 
the argument rests on the premise that in order to maintain export competitive- 
ness, the economy and polity must make optimal policy choices that “disci- 
pline macroeconomic policy.” Sound fiscal policies, which are defined to in- 
clude temporary budget deficits, are seen to be necessary because they permit 
the central bank to implement export-promoting policies without immediately 
jeopardizing price stability. Lin, Lee, and Huang also take up the issue of cen- 
tral bank independence and its link to inflation. The paper covers a broad range 
of issues, such as whether macroeconomic policies matter, which facets of 
these policies matter, and so on. My comments are organized according to the 
sections of the paper. 
Section 7.2 presents some stylized facts on macroeconomic policy and 
growth in the two countries. Growth theories regard investment as a crucial 
link between macroeconomic policy and long-run growth. However, this asso- 
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ciation does not hold across subperiods for Taiwan and Korea. This is in con- 
formity with the evidence reported in Fischer (1991) and Dervis and Petri 
(1987). 
The authors attribute the above finding for Taiwan to increased investment 
by state-owned enterprises, well known for “inefficiency and massive corrup- 
tion.” For Korea, they attribute it to government targeting of heavy chemical 
industries, which led to substantial idle capacity and subsequent bailing out by 
state-owned banks. However, the lack of positive association could also be due 
to changes in incremental capital output ratio (which would seem to be the 
case in Korea) and to other structural changes. 
The authors regard the industrial targeting policies of the two countries as 
failures when measured in terms of exports, productivity performance, and 
structural change. Does this imply that winners are more difficult to pick at 
more advanced stages of economic development? To put it differently, are the 
results of government intervention related to the stage of economic develop- 
ment? Do the type, form, and degree of intervention matter at different stages? 
In addition to the above, there are four other findings: 
1. Contrary to theoretical expectations and empirical findings for Latin 
America and Asia, a negative relationship does not exist between growth and 
inflation in Korea and Taiwan. There is also no clear association between ex 
post real interest rates and per capita GDP growth rates in different subperiods. 
This is attributed to the availability of alternative sources of finance, from the 
informal sector in Taiwan and from external borrowing in Korea. 
2. Large budget deficits can be expected to exert a negative impact on GDP. 
The data show that this was true for Korea during 1961-80, but not to the same 
extent for Taiwan. It should be noted, however, that for both countries, deficits/ 
surpluses are extremely low. Thus their impact is unlikely to be significant. 
How do government expenditure-GDP ratios or deficit/surplus-GDP ratios 
compare internationally? What about the composition of government spend- 
ing? Would this make a difference? 
3. The paper argues that sound fiscal policy matters for economic growth, 
and soundness is defined to include low budget deficits. Yet the authors write, 
“That is, permanent low budget deficits do not lead to better growth perfor- 
mance, if they cause delays in the construction of infrastructure necessary for 
further growth.” It would seem, therefore, that it is not deficits per se, but rather 
the kind of government expenditure, that also matters. 
4. The early fiscal discipline in these two countries has or is likely to weaken 
because of external pressure to reduce current account surpluses. The resultant 
currency appreciation, with its impact on exports, demands policy shifts to 
increase domestic spending, to be achieved through fiscal stimuli. 
To verify the stylized facts, the writers run growth regressions for the period 
1961-92. By and large the results are not very robust. This may be the conse- 
quence of model specification. The authors claim that a commitment to growth 
through exports endogenizes macropolicy variables and measures of economic 
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growth. This according to them explains the poor results. In addition, their 
empirical findings are at odds with those of others, such as Fischer (1991) and 
Levine and Renelt ( 1  992), regarding the link between investment and per cap- 
ita GDP growth. 
While real export growth does matter, the writers note that “we cannot know 
how export growth led to such excellent growth performance without imposing 
and testing structural restrictions on export growth and GDP growth.” A non- 
rigorous mechanism is however explained in section 7.3 of the paper. 
In section 7.3, macroeconomic policies, that is, fiscal and monetary policies, 
are examined in the context of central bank independence. On conceptual 
grounds it could be argued that central bank independence does have the poten- 
tial to improve long-run inflationary performance. The empirical evidence, 
however, i 3  far from compelling. 
The authors, following Cukierman (1992), compute an index of central bank 
independence for Korea and Taiwan. While both received relatively high 
scores for average legal independence compared to 16 industrial countries 
(table 7.4), their average inflation rates in the period 1973-87 are among the 
highest for those countries. This they attribute to difficulty in implementing 
the relevant laws. As an alternative explanatory factor, they use the actual turn- 
over rate of central bank presidents to explain the inflation rate. However, as 
can be observed from table 7.4, the evidence goes both ways. 
Perhaps the real issue is not central bank independence per se, but rather the 
recognition of the need to coordinate fiscal and monetary policies if price level 
stability is to be preserved. There is an accompanying need to develop govern- 
ment securities markets as an alternative to financing from central banks. 
Nevertheless, recent amendments to Taiwan’s central bank legislation allow 
debt monetization, which when viewed in the light of recent increases in bud- 
get deficits could result in higher inflation. 
Section 7.4, on special loan policies, examines the measures used to stimu- 
late exports in the two economies. In the main these took the form of preferen- 
tial credit to targeted industries and activities. This in any event is not unique. 
The difference, however, is that such credit was and is specifically targeted to 
export activities, with more direct measures being employed in Korea. Also in 
both countries, the main channels were state-owned commercial banks, al- 
though there is no reason why such policy cannot be executed where banks are 
privately owned-the case in many developing economies. 
Policies of this nature smack of financial repression, a subject of a rather 
long-standing but inconclusive debate in the development literature. In Korea 
and Taiwan, subsidized credit was directed to growth sectors, specifically ex- 
ports. As firms producing for the export market are more efficient than those 
producing for sheltered domestic markets, subsidized credit enhanced eco- 
nomic growth. Or as Stiglitz would put it, the social returns from such regula- 
tions exceeded the private returns. 
Section 7.5 of the paper is concerned with current account and exchange 
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rate policy. In the first part, it is argued that while the exports of manufactured 
goods yielded the necessary foreign exchange for economic growth, the robust 
export performance was not the result of aggressive devaluation. The second 
part is a chronology of policy changes and the problems of dealing with export 
success-current account surpluses. For Taiwan, the paper describes the mon- 
etary measures the country’s central bank took to deal with the huge increase 
in foreign reserves. One of the measures cited is not very clear, “the deposits 
replaced by the PSS [postal saving system].” It would have been useful to ex- 
plain this in greater detail and to compare it with other conventional measures. 
In the early 1980s, together with other less-developed countries, Korea had 
a large external debt. Its success in dealing with that problem is attributed in 
this paper to devaluation and restrictive monetary policy. Undoubtedly, export 
orientation generated the necessary foreign exchange. However, fiscal policies 
which contribute to export and income growth also assist debt repayment. 
Since much of the focus of the paper is on the role of fiscal policy, it is surpris- 
ing that the link is not explored here. 
Since the mid- 1980s both Taiwan and Korea have been under pressure to 
appreciate their currencies. Both have liberalized imports and employed other 
measures to stimulate domestic demand, both private and public. The paper 
does not mention the upsurge in their foreign direct investment to mitigate the 
dampening effects of the appreciation. 
The first-tier East Asian NIEs, including Taiwan and Korea, relied on manu- 
factured exports to fuel economic growth. This export promotiodorientation 
took place in a stable macroeconomic environment. By itself this would not 
have been enough. Nonmacroeconomic policies (which the paper does not 
mention), such as the trade and payments regime, labor market conditions and 
policies, infrastructure, the role and efficiency of the public sector, and human 
resource development, were equally important. All these nonmacroeconomic 
policies also involve government intervention. Where such intervention led to 
wealth creation instead of rent seeking and reduced distortions, its contribution 
was positive. 
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